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At a time when the options a President may follow in
pursuing foreign policy seem to be diminishing, it is essen-
tial to study the consequences of past foreign policy deci-
sions and programs to determine which were successful and
remain viable. The course followed by the U.S. in dealing
with Chile during Salvador Allende ' s administration (19 70-
19 73) brought criticism to the President and State Department,
and discredit to the intelligence community. America has
repudiated the ideal John Kennedy espoused in his inaugural
address: "We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to
assure the survival and success of liberty."
This thesis deals with U.S. relations with Chile during
the tumultuous years of Allende ' s regime. It seeks to test
the hypothesis that the U.S. government, in concert with U.S.-
owned multinational corporations, pursued a course of action,
publicly, economically and covertly, bent on discrediting,
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Few political events arouse as much comment as the rise
and fall of Salvador Allende ' s socialist administration in
Chile. A survey of the literature covering this period of
the early 1970s shows an unusual amount of emotion used to
describe these turbulent years. The election of Allende,
backed by a Marxist coalition, was perceived by United States
observers as the biggest crisis in United States-Latin Ameri-
can relations since the Dominican revolt of 1965. It was
also viewed as a threat to the long-established Monroe Doc-
trine because of the close ties between the Chilean Communist
Party and the Soviet Union. Allende promptly began to nation-
alize major United States' investments, redistribute agri-
cultural lands, revolutionize Chilean social institutions,
and reorient Chilean foreign policy.
The Soviets saw his election as a major diplomatic break-
through in Latin American relations. Allende referred to the
Soviet Union as Chile's "Big Brother" (hermano mayor) and
expected the Soviets to become the main economic bulwark of
the regime. The Chilean Communist Party had long been one
of the most loyal pro-Soviet parties in Latin America. It
unstintingly supported the many and varied positions of Soviet
foreign policy - including the Soviet-bloc invasion of Czecho-
slavakia in 19 6 3 - and echoed Moscow's themes of anti-imper-
ialism and class warfare.

To developing nations , the Allende victory gave hope of
a "separate road" to economic development , one free from the
dominating influence of either the United States or the Sov-
iet Union. It was hoped that the Chilean experience would
lend needed support to the Euro-communists who were struggling
to break free from Soviet domination. But "Communists and
Socialists in France and Italy, who had earlier pointed to
Chile as a model of peaceful transition to socialism, moved
to disengage themselves from the Allende disaster."
Others did not see the overthrow of Allende merely as a
devastating setback to the advancement of socialism, but
rather as a crushing blow to the hopes of the developing
peoples of the world. Their disappointment has been emotion-
2
ally presented by Gary MacEoin, who stated:
This Chilean experience has a much wider meaning
for mankind. Its attempt to find a new road to
economic and social well-being aroused the hopes
and anticipations of vast numbers of people in
all parts of the world who know that man has re-
cently achieved such control of his environment
that he can here and now provide decent living
levels to the two-thirds of mankind who lack them.
The brutal closing of that road must force all
these expectant millions to re-evaluate their
assumptions, (and) will undoubtedly drive many of
them to more extreme and violence-prone stands
.
Allende, as an individual, was looked upon either as a "saint"
or "satan," leading the underdeveloped masses to the promised
""James D. Theberge , The Soviet Presence in Latin America
,
p. 82, Crane, Russak £ Co., 1974.
2 Gary MacEoin, No Peaceful Way: Chile's Struggle For
Dignity
, p. 2, Sheed and Ward, 19 74.
a

land or trying to yoke the downtrodden with another totali-
tarian Marxist government.
Part of the reason for the world's high interest in
Chilean politics was the fact that it was one of the "ABC"
countries of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile),
as much European as Latin American. It had a highly cultured
and educated populace in comparison with other Latin American
countries and it had shown a unique polictical stability for
nearly 150 years. 3etween 1337 and 197C, no leading Chilean
statesman or high-ranking military officer had been assassi-
nated. As one author stated: "In terms of continuity of
governments it has been said that Chile's political history
between the 1830s and 19 73 would make most European countries
3look like 'banana republics.'"
The rise and fall of Salvador Allende Gossens ' Marxist
administration in Chile marked a significant watershed in
United States' relations with Latin America. Much has been
written about the United States ' role in the overthrow and
assassination of Allende. Both praise and criticism has
been leveled at the public and private sectors of U.S.
society in connection with the course they pursued in dealing
with Allende 's Chile. The hypothesis of this thesis is that
the United States government, in concert with large U.S.





corporations, systematically moved to ensure the failure of
Allende's Marxist regime. The thesis will deal with public,
economic, and covert relations between the two countries as
well as the evidence and speculation linking United States'**
governmental and corporate sectors to the coup d'etat which
took place on 11 September 1973. To set the stage on which
these relations took place, the general political background
of Chile, in general, and of Salvador Allende , in particular,
will be discussed.
A. HISTORY OF MODERN POLITICAL PARTIES IN CHILE
The historical development of Chilean political parties
is .inseparable from the social and religious developments of
Chile. Two great classes of individuals developed within
Chile: the ruling oligarchy and the lower classes. Chile
does have a large middle-class but it lacks social cohesive-
ness and generally follows the lead of the ruling oligarchy.
Foundations of this developmental pattern are to be found
in the colonial exploitation of Chilean resources. The
economic exploitation of Chile will be developed in a later
section
.
The lower classes of Chilean society comprise nearly two-
thirds of the population, but for most of modern political
history they have been effectively kept from exercising power
within the government. The ruling oligarchy held the govern-
mental positions, owned or operated the industries, and
10

controlled the economy. Such an unequal distribution of
power and income led inevitably to separate political philo-
sophies. In order to maintain their power, the ruling oli-
garchy moved cautiously to the left but the lower classes
moved radically left in search of a panacea for their ills.
The growing unrest of the lower classes can be easily
followed by counting the increasing number of major strikes
found in Chile during the latter years of the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Between 1849 and 1884 there were
only nine major strikes in all of Chile. Between 1885 and
1910 the number jumped to 290. And during the next fifteen
a.
years (1911-1925) the number leaped to 747. Literature
decrying the plight of the working classes was largely ig-
nored. The most active area of unrest was in the north
where nitrate workers were continually fighting for improved
conditions. One of their complaints was that oven pits,
where pulverized nitrate ore was processed at 2 50 F. , were
uncovered and scores of workers had fallen into them and died
in agony. On 21 December 19 7, in an attempt to stop a strike
in the north, military forces were sent to the area and shot
to death some two thousand men, women and children who failed
to disperse within a five-minute time limit.
Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela , Chile
Politics and Society
,
p. 138, Transaction Books, 1976
Frederick B. Pike , Chile and the United States, 1880-1962 ,
University of Notre Dame Press, 196 3.
11

Such brutal actions made workers a fertile field for
radical .labor organizations. Under the leadership of Luis
Emilio Recabarren, a typographical worker, the Labor Federa-
tion of Chile (Gran Federacion Obrera de Chile), commonly
referred to as the FOCH, became the most important labor
organization in Chile. The FOCH was founded in 1909 as a
conservative mutual aid society, but by 1917 was an avowed
revolutionary organization. In 19 21 at the third Communist
International it declared its allegiance to communism.
In 1912 Recabarren organized a political party to com-
plement the FOCH. At first called the Socialist Labor Party
(Partido Socialista Obrera) , it became the Communist Party
(Partido Comunista) in 19 22 and joined the Third International
along with the FOCH. It was not until 1931, however, that
the Communist Party was officially recognized and authorized
to present candidates for national and local elections.
In response to the plight and increasing demands of the
lower - and now organizing - classes, there developed a mild
schism in the ruling oligarchy. The largest segment of the
oligarchy wanted no change in the status quo and viewed the
revolutionary ferment as the work of a few subversive trouble-
makers acting in a manner alien to national traditions. A
smaller sector of "responsible reformers" were just as com-
mitted to the status quo but recognized a need "to ease the
plight of the lower classes to such a degree that they would
be willing to remain an inert element in the hierarchical,
12

stratified structure." All of these programs were aimed at
problems identified by the oligarchy and not the lower classes.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
,
the ruling oligarchy was splintered into several competing
parties: National, Liberal Democratic, Conservative, Liberal,
Radical, and Democratic. However, all of these parties had
a common thread, the maintenance of the status quo. The Con-
servative Party compiled the best record during this period
of any of the parties in introducing social-reform legisla-
tion, but its fundamental concern was more with charity than
justice. The democrats called for a gradual redistribution
of wealth but seemed to want "everthing for everyone within
7
the framework of the status quo."
In 19 3 3 another group of Marxists, who were unwilling to
adjust to Moscow's line, formed the Socialist Party (Partido
Socialista) with Oscar Schnake , a one-time anarchist, as
secretary-general . Another member of the founding group was
Salvador Allende. The Socialist Party indentified more closely
with the working class than did the Communist Party, and
placed greater emphasis on class struggle. During the 1960's
the Socialist Party tended to sympathize with Castro and Mao.
A Nazi Party, the Nationlist Socialist Party (Partido Nacional











acceptance with either the oligarchy or the lower classes.
In 1935 Moscow dispatched Euducio Ravines, a brilliant Peru-
vian organizer, to organize a united front in Chile. The
attempt was unsuccessful in capturing a majority of the pop-
ular vote, but in 1938 the Popular Front, in coalition with
the Radical Party, did succeed in backing the winning presi-
dential candidate. The united front concept was pressed by
the left for the next thirty-five years with only limited
success
.
Young Catholic intellectuals broke from the National Par-
ty in 1937 and formed the National Falange , forerunner of
today's Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democrata Cris-
tiano) . One of these young intellectuals was Eduardo Frei
who was to play a major role in Chilean politics. In 1969
the left wing of the Christian Democratic Party defected to
form the Movement of United Popular Action (Movimiento de
Accion Popular Unitaria) . Another more militant leftist
group was formed in 1965 at the University of Concepcion,
known as the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento
de Izquierda Revolucionaria) . The latter two movements re-
flected the dramatic shift to the left that Chilean politics
took in the 19617s, setting the stage for the election of
Salvador Allende in 1970.
Before examining the decade leading to Allende ' s three
turbulent years in power, a brief review of the political
parties and their political persuasions is in order. The
14

parties, starting from the political right, were these:
Fatherland and Liberty (Patria y Libertad, PL). The PL was
founded in September 1970 by a lawyer, Pablo Rodriguez Grez,
who had been a member of Alessandri's campaign committee.
A neo-fascist organization, the PL was at the forefront of
conservative opposition to Allende. The PL was widely
credited with the assassination of General Rene Schneider
Chereau in October 1970 during an attempt to discredit
Allende before he could assume office. The PL was supposed
to have connections with the Central Intelligence Agency.
National Party (Partido Nacional , PN) . First established
in the mid-18 5 0's along with the Conservative and Liberal
Parties, by the late 19 6 0's they had all fused under the
National Party banner. From 19 33 on, the Conservative and
Liberal Parties formed an unofficial coalition to direct
policy or wield a generally effective veto. The National
3Party was "the unequivocal voice of the oligarchy."
Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democrata Crist iano, PDC
)
Started in 1937 as an alternative to the conservatism of the
National Party, it adopted a moderate left position during
the 1950's. It sought social progress and fairer distribu-
tion of national income through existing economic structures
.
Later the party moved cautiously towards non-Marxist
Op. Cit., MacEoin, p. 21
15

socialism by stressing the need for cooperative ownership of
the means of production.
Radical Party (Partido Radical, PR). Formed in 1862 as a
reaction against oligarchic rule, it represented the center
of Chilean politics and proved to be remarkably elastic in
its ability to form coalitions with parties both to the
right and to the left. This ideological instability was
particularly pronounced during the 19 6 (7s.
Movement of United Popular Action (Movimiento de Accion
Popular Unitaria, MAPU) . Formed in 1969, the Movement of
United Popular Action was a reaction to rightward drift of
the Christian Democrats when in power. Standing for the
same policies as the Christian Democrats , MAPU pressed for
more aggressive implementation of those policies.
Communist Party (Partido Comunista, PC). Founded in 1912,
it formally became known as the Communist Party in 1922. It
was a staunch supporter of the Soviet Union and was generally
conservative and legalistic in its promotion of revolutionary
programs
.
Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS). Founded in 1933
as an alternative Marxist organization without ties to Mos-
cow, it generally cooperated with the Communists and
other leftist organizations. Allende maintained his associ-
ation with the party from its founding until his death.
The Socialist Party was more sympathetic to Communist China
and Cuba than the Communist Party.
16

Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movirniento de Izquierda
Revolucionaria, MIR). The Movement of the Revolutionary Left
was the most militant of all Chilean parties. Formed in 1965.
it encouraged the lower classes to arm and take direct action
in order to seize land and other resources. They became as
difficult for Allende to contend with as the members of Pa-
tria y Libertad.
B. THE 1960s: POLARIZATION AND THE SWING TO THE LEFT
The leftist organizations entered the 1960s with great
hope. In the 1958 presidential election, Salvador Allende,
presidential candidate for the Popular Action Front (Frente
de Accion Popular, FRAP), was only narrowly defeated by the
right-supported candidate Jorge Alessandri, the son of for-
mer President Arturo Alessandri. The margin of victory for
Alessandri was only 33,500 votes out of 1,235,552 cast. Also
running for president as the Christian Democrat's candidate
was Eduardo Frei. Alessandri, Frei and Allende dominated
Chilean politics for the next fifteen years.
Alessandri was a self-styled independent and made no
secret of his aversion to traditional party politics. An
engineer by training, and a businessman by trade, he promised
to bring efficiency, austerity and rationality to government.
Frei, in contrast, was a professional politician. He was a
brilliant orator, possessed of the ability to make compli-
cated programs comprehensible to the average Chilean. His
17

strong commitment to Catholic social thought and austere
appearance made him a particularly attractive candidate to
Chilean women. Allende was making his second of four attempts
at the Chilean presidency. A more in-depth look at Allende
will be made later in this section.
Alessandri proved himself incapable of harnessing the
runaway inflation that had plagued Chile for seventy years.
He did manage to pass a land reform measure expropriating
idle lands . He also tried to cope with the growing shanty-
towns (callampas or mushrooms) which were springing up on
every available piece of land around Santiago. These pro-
grams, however, cost Alessandri the support of the conser-
vative parties even though he never lost his personal
popularity
.
Since the Chilean constitution forbade Alessandri from
succeeding himself, the 196M- election soon became a two-man
race between Frei and Allende. Though the platforms of the
two candidates appeared nearly identical, the conservative
parties flocked to support Frei because of their fear of
Allende and his Marxist-backed coalition. Frei's victory
in September 1964 did not come as a surprise*, he was ex-
pected to win. What was surprising - and disappointing to
the left - was the margin of Frei's victory. Frei received
56.1 percent of the vote to Allende' s 38.9 percent. The




Frei promised a "Revolution in Liberty" and moved impres-
sively in the first few years of his administration. Frei
was soon to be abandoned by both the left and right . The
right felt he was moving too fast and doing too much, while
the left felt he was moving too slowly and not doing enough.
To complicate matters, Allende had been elected president
of an increasingly hostile Senate. As the 1970 election
approached, all sides began looking for a candidate. It
soon became a three-man confrontation: one candidate backed
by the left, one backed by the Christian Democrats, and one
backed by the right
.
Sensing the split in the coalition that had swept Frei
into office in 1964- , the socialist parties reorganized into
the Popular Unity (Unidad Popular, UP) for the upcoming
election. Frei gave his personal support to the Christian
Democratic candidate, Radomiro Tomic , while the right sup-
ported the former president, Jorge Alessandri. Alessandri
immediately became the betting favorite. But this time
Allende, backed by the Popular Unity, turned the tables on
Alessandri and defeated him by 39,17 5 votes with Tomic fin-
ishing a distant third (see Table I ) .
Several factors contributed to Allende' s surprising
plurality in the 1970 election. The first of these has al-
ready been mentioned: the breakdown of the Christian Demo-








Jorge Alessandri Liberal, Conservative 31.6
Salvador Allende FRAP 2 8.9
Eduardo Frei PDC 2 0.7
Luis Bossay Radical 15.5




Eduardo Frei PDC 56.1
Salvador Allende FRAP 3 3.9
Julio Duran Radical 5 .
100.0
1970
Salvador Allende UP 3 6.6
Jorge Alessandri National 35.2
Radomiro Tomic PDC 28 .
1
99.9
Source: Valenzuela, Arturo , and Valenzuela, J. Samuel, Chile
Politics and Society, p. 91, Transaction Books, 1976.
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influenced the 1970 election was that the workers of Chile
were organizing at an increasing rate. In 196U there were
actually fewer unions and union members than there had been
in 1953. The 1964 figures were: 1,863 unions with 271,000
members. By 1970 those totals had more than doubled with
9 . .
1,519 unions representing 551,000 workers. This unioniza-
tion not only helped to encourage a growing militancy among
the workers, but it tended to shift Chilean politics to the
left.
A third factor contributing to this leftward movement was
the mobilization of the traditionally unorganized and passive
slum dwellers in the shantytowns surrounding Chilean cities
.
It was easy to radicalize this impoverished group because
they felt the Christian Democrats had not moved swiftly
enough to relieve their plight. The last factor aiding the
socialists was the growing support of the Catholic Church
for the plight of the lower classes. Historically the Church
had supported the oligarchy and had served to keep the lower
classes in line by convincing them to accept their lot in
life. The first signs of this shift in Church policy appeared
during the Second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965. Bishops
from several Latin American countries committed the Church
"to a new relationship with the suffering masses of humanity,
9
„Op. Cit., De Vylder, p. 2 6
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a program which quickly identified them as on a collision
course with the status quo." This commitment was reaffirmed
by Pope Paul in 1968 when he visited Bogota, Colombia.
Allende's relative majority in the 1970 election did not
guarantee him the presidency. According to the Chilean con-
stitution, the National Congress had to decide among the two
leading candidates if neither received a clear majority of
the popular vote. In 1970 the Popular Unity held 80 seats,
the Christian Democrats held 75 seats, and the right held
the remaining 45 seats of the 200 seat Congress (50 seats in
the Senate and 150 seats in the House of Deputies). There
were several attempts to short circuit Allende's election
including a plan called the "Alessandri Formula." This for-
mula called for the election of Alessandri who would immedi-
ately resign, allowing Eduardo Frei to run representing the
entire right in a new election. This plan was abandoned be-
cause it would have undoubtedly precipitated a civil war.
Other plans, including economic sabotage and military over-
throw, were also abandoned when the Popular Unity signed an
agreement with the Christian Democrats which the latter felt
would ensure the "survival of democracy." This agreement
may well have prophesied the events of 11 September 197 3.
The agreement included that Allende would not make any changes
in the hierarchy of the armed forces; further, approval by
10
Op. Cit., MacEoin, p. 15
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the Senate was required for any military appointments. This
agreement gave the military an awesome autonomy and hardly
aided the prospects for success of the "Chilean road to social-
ism." Allende was elected president on 24 October 1970 and
formally took office on 3 November.
C. SALVADOR ALLENDE GOSSENS: MEDICINE AND MARXISM
It is not the intent, nor is it within the scope of this
thesis, to present a lengthy biography of Salvador Allende;
but rather, to briefly examine the man and his background.
Salvador Allende Gossens was born into a fairly well-to-do
family in Valparaiso, a fact for which he had to apologize
throughout his political career. As Allende stated, "In
orthodox terms
,
yes , my origins are bourgeois , but I would
add that my family was not associated with the economically
powerful of the bourgeoisie."
As a young medical student he became active in militant
organizations and studied Lenin, Marx and Trotsky. At the
age of 2 5 he became a founding member of the Socialist Party.
Five years later he became a cabinet minister in the Popular
Front administration of 19 38. He continued to be active in
Marxist causes and became friends with Fidel Castro and Che
Guevara. He was a member of the Chilean Congress for twenty
years and ran for president of Chile four times (1952, 1958,






1964,1970). In 1964 he was elected President of the Senate
after being defeated by Eduardo Frei for president of the
republic
.
Allende had close ties with all three unsuccessful social-
ist administrations that came to power in Chile. The 1932
Socialist Republic lasted only twelve days . It was led by
Marmaduke Grove, a brother of Allende' s brother-in-law. The
Popular Front government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, a Radical
Party candidate supported by the Communists and Socialists,
came into power in 1938. Though it was more progressive than
former administrations, it was far from being a socialistic
government. It did include, however, Marxists and other
leftist individuals as ministers , including the young Salva-
dor Allende as Minister of Health. The Popular Front disin-
tegrated with the death of Cerda in 1941. The third social-
ist administration was Allende' s own. Allende was 62 years
of age when he assumed the presidency in 1970.
Allende was committed to bringing socialism to Chile
through democratic processes. A copy of The Guerrilla War
which was given to Allende by Guevara bears this dedication:
"To Salvador Allende , who is trying to obtain the same re-
12
suit by other means. Affectionately, Che." "The same
result" to which Guevara was referring was a proletariat







principles proclaimed: "During the process of totally trans-
forming the system, a dictatorship of organized workers is
13
necessary." When the military ended Allende's dream of
democratic revolution, he chose to die using a submachine
gun which was a gift from Fidel Castro.
Allende came to power under conditions of political tur-
moil, economic chaos and polarization of the populace. Adding
to this chaotic environment was the fact that the United
States had a deep mistrust of Allende and his Marxist views.
This thesis is basically concerned with U.S. -Chilean rela-
tions based on this mistrust . Allende became much more than
the President of Chile in 1970. He became a symbol to al-
most every political faction. He represented triumph, hope
and independence to the left; and, he symbolized repression,
folly and dictatorship to those who opposed him. The fact
that he was democratically elected only tended to increase
the fear and bitterness of those who opposed him and his
ideas
.
Invariably, labels of right and wrong are subjectively
placed on all political actions, regardless of their loca-
tion in the political spectrum. This thesis will attempt
to avoid such labels and will direct all comment to the
facts in support of or against the hypothesis. It will be








II. U.S. NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF ALLENDE ' S CHILE
A. BACKGROUND
It is logical to assume that any orchestrated movement
to discredit and overthrow the Allende regime would have be-
gun with a massive and critical public relations campaign
against Allende. 'Critics of United States' policy towards
Chile have, in fact, charged that major U.S. newspapers pre-
sented one-sided press coverage of Allende 's Chile. The
newspapers which have been singled out are: The New York Times
,
The Washington Post , The Christian Science Monitor , The Wall
Street Journal , the Miami Herald , and the Los Angeles Times .
The New York Times was particularly criticized for its cover-
age since it "enjoys an awesome reputation for its coverage
of foreign affairs, and is considered so authoritative in
Latin America that articles printed in the Times often appear
the following day in leading newspapers throughout the region.
The Times is thought to represent not simply one paper's
. . . 14
opinion but the 'American' position abroad."
The criticisms of U.S. newspapers generally fell into
five major categories: (1) They presented Allende as essen-
tially an unpopular president. When he was mentioned he was
labeled a Marxist in the first one or two paragraphs.
14John C. Pollock
,
with Torry Dickinson and Joseph Somma,
"Did Eichmann Have a Sense of Humor? The New York Times and
Militarism in Chile," Latin American Studies Association News -
letter
, Vol. IV, No. 4, p. 36, December 1973.
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(2) Allende's difficulties were invariably presented as be-
ing of crisis proportions and his successes were rarely, if
ever, mentioned. They also presented Allende as having made
little progress during his tenure in office. (3) Resentment
of multinational corporations was presented as being Marxist-
inspired instead of nationalist ically inspired. They also
failed to investigate the influence of the multinational
corporations - such as ITT, Anaconda, and Kennecott - on the
politics of Chile. (4) They reported only the feelings and
attitudes of the upper and middle classes. The lower classes
were not given credit for having the ability or education
necessary to make correct choices about the path government
ought to have taken. (5) Threats to the government were
presented as coming only from the left. When right-wing
organizations were involved in anti-government activities
they were never so labeled.
Time and source constraints have limited the scope of
this study to investigating only part of the criticisms that
have been mentioned. It will also involve only two of the
six previously mentioned U.S. newspapers: The New York Times
Ibid.; also the following references: John Pollock,
"Reporting on Chile: What the Press Leaves Out," The Nation
,
29 January 1973; Dale Johnson „ ed., "The New Cold War in
Latin America: The U.S. Press and Chile," in The Chilean
Road to Socialism
, Doubleday Anchor, 1973; Michele Pollock
,
The U.S. Press and Chile: Ideolo gy and International Conflict ,
Warner Modules, Inc., 1974; and Louis Wolf Goodman , "Chile:





and The Washington Post . Specific methodology will be dis-
cussed, later in this section. The primary thrust of this
study is to determine whether these two U.S. newspapers pre-
sented a substantially different or more negative picture
of Chile than a major international (foreign) newspaper:
The Times (London). The Times (London) was selected because
1 fi
it is considered "an elite newspaper read worldwide."
In order to place the findings in perspective, it is
necessary to recognize that not all events are reported in
newspapers. It has been shown that western newspapers tend
to report more negative news than positive news about third
17
world countries . The several reasons for this bias will
briefly be discussed.
For any event to find its way into print, it must possess
one or more "news factors." The single most important news
factor is meaningfulness to the readers of the newspaper.
"Meaningfulness involves two dimensions: proximity and rele-
1
8
vance. " Proximity means that an event must have taken
place in a neighboring or nearby state. If proximity is
lacking in an event, then relevance becomes the most important
1 c
Sophia Peterson, News Coverage of the Third World by
the Western News Agencies and Elite Press
,
p. 1, paper pre-
sented for delivery at the annual meetings of the Interna-










dimension of meaningfulness . An event may be perceived as
relevant if it occurs in a nation that is politically, cul-
turally, or economically similar. An event may also be con-
sidered relevant if the nation involved has some salient tie
with the reporting country (i.e., membership together in an
international organization, an alliance, etc.).
Other news factors include: brevity, unambiguity, con-
sonance, and unexpectedness. All of these factors are gen-
erally found in negative events happening in the third world
(particularly in Latin America) . Negative events generally
conform nicely to the daily publishing schedule of most news-
papers because they happen in a short time span . They are
unambiguous in the sense that it is easy to discern the con-
sequences of the event. They are generally consonant with
the developed world's perception of the unrest continually
present in developing nations. And negative events are un -
expected because they occur less frequently than cooperative
or participative events. Thus, negative events are generally
more newsworthy than other types of events.
Sophia Peterson notes, "If we find that news coverage
of third world countries consists of a higher proportion of
negative news than does news coverage of the first world,
the explanation may lie in this need for news from dissimi-
lar countries to compensate for lack of meaninfulness with
. . 19






country, when discussing which stories are reported on
television. Negative stories seem to dominate the news
when the space available is limited by time or area.
"One of the most common observations among those who study
the news process is that negative or conflictual events
are regarded as more newsworthy.
In her study involving The Times (London), Peterson coded
articles concerning third world countries involved in inter-
national news events for one month. Her coding was organized
according to the rules and event category scheme developed
by the World Event / Interaction Survey (WEIS). Her WEIS
data was further divided into three major types of events:
conflictual (negative), cooperative (positive), and partici-
patory (neutral) events. These events were analyzed not
only for The Times (London) but also for the four leading
news agencies: Associated Press, United Press International,
Reuters, and Agence France-Presse . Her findings are located
in Table II . Since the Peterson study and this study have
more differences than similarities in the data being analyzed.
only general trends of the Peterson study will be of concern
or interest. It should be noted that negative and neutral
events dominate the survey with a total of 74.1% of The Times












NEWS COVERAGE DISTRIBUTION BY NEWS SOURCE: ACTORS
COOPERATIVE, PARTICIPATIVE AND CONFLICTUAL EVENTS^
NEWS SOURCE COOPERATION PARTICIPATION CONFLICT
AP 3 5.5% 3 7.4% 2 7.1%
UPI 3 3.0% 3 7.2% 3 0.2%
AFP 34. 8% 4 7.0% 18.1%
Reuters 3 6.2% 39. 3% 24.5%







B. THE RESEARCH DESIGN
This study was designed to answer the questions raised
by several of the criticisms mentioned earlier. First, did
U.S. newspapers tend to report more negative news about Chile
than comparable foreign newspapers? Second, did U.S. news-
papers tend to label Allende a Marxist more often than foreign
newspapers; and, did they label him early in the article,
thereby distorting it? Coincidentaly , these same questions
will be compared by reporter and news agency. The U.S. news-
papers will be represented by The New York Times and The Wash -
ington Post . The foreign newspapers will be represented by
The Times (London). The news agencies that will be examined
are: the Associated Press, United Press International, Reu-
ters, and Agence France-Presse . Reporters who will be exam-
inded include: Lewis H. Diuguid, Juan de Onis and Richard
Wigg.
Due to a restriction on the availability of The Washing -
ton Post
,
1972 was selected as the period of research. Time
constraints required that only those articles published every
other day - starting with January 1 - be coded. One other
constraint was the unavailability of an index for The Sunday
Times (London); consequently, no articles from The Sunday
Times were coded for inclusion in this analysis. Table III
shows the raw numbers of articles coded from each source
.
Since the scope of this study was to determine the over-














New York Times 84 35.9 35.9
Washington Post 82 35 .0 70.9











New York Times 70 33. 5 33.5
Washington Post 71 34.0 67. 5




newspapers, all articles (covering both international and
domestic events) and editorials were coded. Table IV lists
the event categories into which these articles and editorials
were coded. These codes are modified WEIS codes and were
further divided into three major types of events: positive,
negative and neutral. These categories are correlated with
cooperative , conflictual and participatory events respect-
fully. An example of the coding sheet used in data collec-
tion is found in Figure 1. All coding was completed by a
single researcher and therefore no intercoder reliability
check was performed. Since the research was completed in a
relatively few weeks, intracoder reliability was also not
considered to be a problem.
C. DATA ANALYSIS
Coded data was transferred to punched cards and analyzed




monly referred to as SPSS. Multiple computer runs, using
the assets of the W. R. Church computer center at the Naval
Postgraduate School, were made comparing the different news
sources for variations. Frequency tabulation, chi-square
test of statistical significance and Cramer's V measure of
association were the primary calculations involved. The
2 3
Norman H. Nie and others, SPSS: Statistical Package







1. YIELD (Cooperative Events)
Oil Surrender; yield to order
012 Yield position; retreat; evacuate
013 Admit wrongdoing; retract statement
2. COMMENT (Participatory Events)
021 Explicit decline to comment
Q23 Comment on situation -neutral
0.25 Explain policy, future position
026 Comment on situation - positive
027 Comment on situation - negative
3. CONSULT (.Participatory Events)
Q31 Meet with; send note
32 Visit; arrive
033 Receive visit; host
4. APPROVE (Cooperative Events)
041 Praise; hail; applaud; condolences; demonstrate in
favor of
Q42 Endorse other*' s policy or position; give verbal
support
043" Appoint; reinstate
5. PROMISE (.Cooperative Events)
Q51 Promise own policy support
052 Promise material support
Q5 3 Promise other future support
054- Assure; reassure
6. GRANT (Cooperative Events)
061 Express regret; apologize
062 Give state invitation
063 Grant asylum
Q64 Grant privilege; diplomatic recognition; de facto
relations
065 Suspend negative sanctions
066 Release and/or return persons or property




7. REWARD (Cooperative Events)
071 Extend economic aid
072 Extend military assistance
073 Give other assistance
8. AGREE (Cooperative Events)
81 Make substantive agreement
082 Agree to future action or procedure
9. REQUEST (Cooperative Events)
091 Ask for information
092 Ask for policy assistance
093 Ask for material assistance
9 4 Request action; call for (general)
095 Entreat; plead; appeal to; help me
10. PROPOSE (Cooperative Events)
101 Offer proposal
102 Urge or suggest action or policy (specific)
11. REJECT (Conflictual Events)
111 Turn down proposal; reject proposal; veto; deny appeal
112 Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow
113 5': Dismiss; demote; resign with political motive; censure;
impeach; suspend
12. ACCUSE (Conflictual Events)
121 Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove
122 Denounce; denigrate; abuse
13. PROTEST (Conflictual Events)
131 Make protest (not formal)
132 Make formal complaint or protest
fef, DENY (Conflictual Events)
141 Deny an accusation
142 Deny any attributed policy, action, role or position




15. DEMAND (Conflictual Events)
150 Issue order or command-, insist; demand compliance
16. WARN (Conflictual Events)
160 Give warning
17. THREATEN (Conflictual Events)
171 Threat without specific negative sanctions
172 Threat with specific negative sanctions
173 Threat with force specified
174 Ultimatum; threat with negative sanctions and time limit
18. DEMONSTRATE (Conflictual Events)
181 Nonmilitary demonstration; walk out on
182 Armed force mobilization, exercise and/or display
18 3- Strike
18 4- Riot
19. REDUCE RELATIONSHIP (Conflictual Events)
191 Cancel or postpone planned event





195 Break diplomatic relations
20. EXPEL (Conflictual Events)
201 Order personnel out of country
202 Expel organization or group
21. SEIZE (Conflictual Events)
211 Seize position or posessions; nationalize




216* Deny rights; ban




22. FORCE (Conflictual Events)
221 Noninjury destructive act
222 Nonmilitary injury-destruction
223 Military engagement
2 2 4" Escape or attempt
2 2 5" Rebel; mutiny
226" Execute; assassinate; murder or kill
23. GOVERNMENTAL CHANGE (Conflictual Events)
231" Dissolve governmental body; suspend
2 32- Coup d'etat
40. POLITICAL LEADER LEAVES SCENE (Neutral Events)
401* Retire; resign (not for political reasons)
402" Accident; severe illness
40 3- Natural death
404- Suicide
41. ELECTIONS (Participatory Events)
411" National; state-wide
412- Local
413" Plebiscite or referendum
42. GOVERNMENTAL CHANGE (Participatory Events)
421" Regular power transfer
422" Constitutional change or formation of governmental body
43. DISASTERS (Neutral Events)
431" Natural disaster; epidemic
98. EDITORIAL (Cooperative Events)
981 Editorial in support of country or leaders; in support
of plans, policies or programs (foreign)
982" Editorials in support of domestic policies or programs
99. EDITORIAL (Conflictual Events)
991 Editorial critical of foreign policy or leaders
992" Editorial critical of domestic policy or program

















Is Allende mentioned? Yes Mo Labeled a Marxist? Yes Mo
If labeled, in which paragraph is label located? of
Is reference made to leftist groups? Yes No
Is reference made to rightest groups? Yes Mo
Cooperative Event Code §
Participatory Event Code #
Conflictual Event Code #













results of these computer runs are summarized in Tables V-X .
Table V shows the results of a cross-tabulation of source
(which newspaper) by code (positive, negative, or neutral).
It should be noted from the table that all three newspapers
reported a considerably larger amount of negative and neutral
events than positive events. This pattern is consistent with
the findings in Table II for The Times . Surprisingly, The
New York Times reported the highest percentage of positive
news about Chile during the period studied. The significance
of that figure, however, is questionable since the chi-square
comparison of the three newspapers is only significant at the
0.2392 level. The cross-tabulation of The New York Times
(minus the Sunday editions) and The Times (London) by code
found only a slightly improved significance level of 0.1645.
The most important point to note is that there were no
significant differences between the foreign coverage of Chile
and the United States' coverage of Chile. In other words,
it appears unjustified to single out the U.S. press as pre-
senting an unusually harsh or negative picture of Allende '
s
Chile. The findings indicate that the U.S. press followed
a pattern of news coverage consistent with other newspapers
of the first world.
When the data is cross-tabulated for reporter/new agency
by code , other patterns of coverage emerge . Because of the
very limited number of articles by Agence France-Presse that






































be drawn about it. The breakdown of this cross-tabulation is
located in Table VI for the remaining news services : Reuters
,
Associated Press, and United Press International. The two
U.S. news agencies, AP and UPI , were quite similar in their
coverage patterns, both reporting negative news a majority
of the time. Although Reuters appears to be more evenly dis-
tributed across the three codes, it is not significantly dif-
ferent from the other agencies . Comparison results in a chi
square of 3.4-56 which is not significant at the 0.20 level.
The Times (London) relied primarily on the services of Reuters
with 22.1% of its coded articles from news agencies coming
from that source, while using AP and UPI only 4.4% and 2.9%
respectively. The two U.S. newspapers used all three news
agencies about the same
.
Examination of the principal reporters from each news-
paper, Juan de Onis ( New York Times ), Lewis Diuguid ( Washing -
ton Post )
,
and Richard Wigg ( The Times ) , reveals nearly
identical reporting patterns. Unidentified sources (labeled
"Other") had a reporting pattern between those of the repor-
ters and the news agencies. When all sources were compared,
the significance level of chi-square was 0.1813.
The Chilean government felt that the foreign press
,
par-
ticularly the U.S. press, was presenting an unfair picture
of Chile to the world. In September 1971, Chile announced
the closure of the UPI bureau in Santiago. The order was








News Agency Positive Negative Neutral
Associated 7.7 61.5 30.3
Press (2) (16) (8)
Reuters 21.2 36.4 42.4
(7) (12) (14)
United
Press 17.6 52.9 29.4
International (3) (9) (5)
Other- 22.5 43.8 33.7
(20) (39) (30)
Lewis '13.6 31.3 54.5
Diuguid (3) (7) (12)
Juan 9.1 31.3 59.1
de Onis (2) (7) (13)
Richard 19.0 33.3 47.6
Wigg (4) (7) (10)
Totals 17.5 43.2 39.3 100.0
(41) (101) (92) (234)
"Agence France-Presse included.




chief, whom they considered to be antagonistic to the govern-
ment, be withdrawn and replaced. In October 1972, Chile
announced that the government would review all press releases
leaving the country. Foreign correspondents were forbidden
2 5
to transmit news derogatory to Chile. Allende T s government
did not initiate this adversary relationship with the press.
Frei's regime held similar suspicions. On 2 September 1970,
The New York Times' correspondent was refused entry into Chile
because of a recent article. At the time the government de-
clared that no person "who commits acts contrary to Chile"
2 S
will be permitted entry."
The criticism of U.S. newspapers for labeling Allende a
Marxist appears to be the most unfounded of the accusations
.
Table VII presents the number of times that Allende was men-
tioned by each source. All three newspapers are nearly iden-
tical in their reporting percentages . Table VIII notes the
number of times Allende was labeled a Marxist when he was
mentioned in an article. In spite of the accusations against
The New York Times
,
it demonstrated significantly less of a
penchant to label Allende a Marxist than the other two papers.
A comparison of The Times (London) and The Mew York Times
resulted in a chi square of 3.5 799 which was significant at
24
The Times (London), 17 September 1971, p. 5a; and Richard




19 October 1972, p. A30
.


































FREQUENCY WITH WHICH ALLENDE WAS LABELED A MARXIST
When mentioned, is Allende labeled
a Marxist?
Source Yes Mo


















the 0.10 level. No conclusions, however, can be drawn for
the U.S. press since The Washington Post was nearly identical
to The Times (London), The conclusion, which can be validated,
is that no apparent conspiracy to disgrace or discredit Allende
existed in the elite press during the period studied.
The reason for the significant difference between The New
York Times and the other newspapers can be found in Table IX .
The New York Times
'
principal reporter, Juan de Onis
,
failed
to label Allende a Marxist in any of his 22 coded articles.
Table X does verify one of the criticisms presented at
the start of this section, but the criticism applies to all
elite papers and not just to the U.S. press. When Allende
was mentioned and labeled a Marxist, he was so labeled in the
first few paragraphs of the article . The average article
length in which Allende was labeled a Marxist was 13; and,
Allende was generally mentioned in the first two or three
paragraphs of the article.
D. CONCLUSIONS
Many of the accusations presented at the start of this
section have not been tested nor further mentioned. It may
well prove to be that U.S. newspapers showed a strong nega-
tive bias towards Chile during the Allende years as opposed
to their coverage before his regime; but, the evidence in
this study does not indicate the U.S. press operated or re-
















































* Thirty-nine articles made no mention of Allende but are




IN WHICH PARAGRAPH IS „ALLENDE LABELED A MARXIST
Paragraph Absolute Relative Cumulative
Frequency Frequency Frequency
(PCT) (PCT)
1 18 40 .0 40 .0
2 9 20.0 60 .0
3 7 15.6 75.6
4 3 6.7 82 .3
5 3 6.7 89.0
7 1 2 .2 91.2
8 1 2 .2 93.4
10 1 2 ,2 95.6
13 1 2 .2 97.8
14 1
4T
2 .2 100 .0
Mean = 2.466 7
Mode = 1
Median = 2.5
Average number of paragraphs per article 12 .9778
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of the elite press. The bitter criticism leveled at The Mew
York Times seems to be unfounded in fact. It would seem
that those reading the newspaper tended to favor their left
eye. A more general criticism of the entire elite press
would have carried more weight. It does appear that first
world newspapers tend to carry a negatively-skewed view of
the developing world. The U.S. coverage of Chile during the
Allende years certainly falls into this pattern. The point
of this study, however, is that the U.S. press did not sig-
nificantly differ in its coverage of Chile from the rest of
the world. It would therefore seem that any concerted effort
by the U.S. government and/or large corporations to bring
the news media into their efforts to overthrow Allende was
unsuccessful; or alternatively, that they were satisfied with




III. ECONOMIC RELATIONS : THE INVISIBLE BLOCKADE
An often echoed accusation, that the United States and
U.S. -owned multinational corporations tried "to strangle
(Chile's) economy and paralyze trade in (its) principal ex-
port, copper, and to deprive (it) of access to sources of
international financing," was first voiced by President Al-
27lende in an address to the United Nations in 1972. Kenne-
cott Copper Corporation and International Telephone and
Telegraph (ITT) were singled out for their actions which,
according to Allende , were designed "to bring about civil
2 8
war in (Chile)." The debate centered around Allende '
s
program of nationalization. To American eyes, this program
amounted to blatant uncompensated expropriation. To Chile,




Chilean resentment towards the United States, stemming
from United States indifference to Chile f s struggle for
independence in 1818 and for its unilateral declaration of
the Monroe Doctrine in 1822, resulted in little U.S. invest-
ment in Chile until the late nineteenth and early twentieth
27House of Representatives, United States and Chile Dur -
ing the Allende Years, 1970-^1973 , Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Appendix A, p. 386, Government Printing Office, 1974-
.







centuries. By 1880 the United States was involved in only
five percent of all foreign transactions in Chile. This
proportion increased to 13 percent just prior to the First
World War.
Mining provided the most lucrative investment opportuni-
ties and U.S. entrepreneurs became involved in a major way
in the early 190Gfe. The American-owned Braden Copper Company
began exploiting the world's largest underground copper mine,
El Teniente , in 1904. Braden was soon taken over by the
Kennecott Copper Corporation. Kennecott was organized by the
Guggenheims , who already owned Chile ' s nitrate industry through
the Anglo Lautaro Nitrate Company. About the same time Ana-
conda, through its subsidiary the Chile Exploration Company,
acquired one of the world's biggest open-pit copper mines,
Chuquicamata . Controlled in the beginning by Rockefeller
Standard Oil interests, control was later shifted to two
Rockefeller-family banks, First National City and Chase Man-
hattan. A third investment group, which included J. ?. Morgan,
Henry Clay Frick, and Ogden Mills, invested in the Cerro
29Corporation an exploited the Cerro de Pasco mines.
These were profitable ventures. It has been estimated
that during their 6 years of operation, until they were
nationalized by Allende^s government, the nitrate, copper,
29
Op. Cit., MacEoin, pp. 36-37
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and iron industries had taken out of Chile an amount equalling
30Chile's Gross National Product for the past 4-00 years. There
is little wonder that these and other U.S. corporations looked
31
with dread at the nationalization of their assets in Chile.
Allende felt that multinational corporations were threatening
the sovereignty of Chile. In the United Nations speech, Al-
lende declared, "The power of these corporations is so great
as to transcend all frontiers. ...Their influence and sphere
of action are rudely transforming traditional practices in
international trade, transfer of technology, transmission of
resources among nations, and labor relations. We are wit-
nessing a pitched battle between the great transnational cor-
porations and sovereign states. ...In a word, the entire
32political structure of the world is being undermined."
However exaggerated these statements might appear, they





31Under Eduardo Frei, the copper industry began a slow
movement towards nationalization with the "Chileanization"
of the companies. Under this plan, a majority (51%) of the
corporations were purchased by the government. Chileaniza-
tion vice nationalization reflected the ideological differ-
ences between Frei and Allende. Frei believed in the continued
influx of foreign capital and in the maintenance of produc-
tion; whereas, Allende wanted to free Chile of foreign eco-
nomic dominance.
2
0p. Cit., MacEoin, pp. 44-45.
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Chile. The list of U.S. corporations, along with Kennecott
,
Anaconda, and Cerro , that had major holdings in Chile read
like a "who's who" of American business. They included:
Bethlehem Steel in iron; Marcona Corporation and Diamond
Crystal Company in salt; Grace, General Mills, Ralston-Purina
,
Coca-Cola, and Pepsico in manufactured foodstuffs; Dow, Mon-
santo and Grace in petrochemicals; Xerox, Sperry P.and, Rem-
ington, and National Cash Register in office equipment; Grace,
and Sherwin Williams in paint; Koppers and Johns Mansvilie
in cement; Dupont and Atlas Powder Company in explosives;
RCA, ITT, and General Telephone and Electronics in radio
and television; Studebaker, Chrysler, Ford, and General Mo-
tors in automobiles; Firestone and General Tire in rubber
tires; General Electric and Grace in electric lamps; Armco
Steel, Textron, Kaiser, Koppers, Singer Sewing Machine,
Hoover, North American Rockwell, and Grace in iron and steel
products; General Cables, Phelps Dodge, and Northern Indiana
Brass in copper fabricating; Standard Oil, Mobil, Interna-
tional Basic Economy Corporation, Phillips Petroleum, Gulf,
and Texaco in oil distribution; Sterling Drugs, Parke Davis,
Schering, Abbott Laboratories, Bristol Myers, Pfizer, Squibb,
Wyeth, Upjohn, and American Cyanamid in pharmaceuticals; ITT,
Grace, and Braniff in utilities and transportation; J. Walter
Thompson, Grant Advertising, McCann-Erickson , and Kenyon and
Eckhardt in advertising; Bank of America, First National City
Bank, International Basic Economy Corporation, John Hancock
54

Mutual Life, Home Insurance Company, and Great American In-
surance Company in banking and finance; Dun and Bradstreet,
Price Waterhouse , Arthur Young, and International Basic Econ-
omy Corporation in management and accounting services; eight
major U.S. movie producers (accounting for 65 percent of all
playing time in Chilean theaters); and others such as Gil-
lette, Proctor and Gamble, Chemway , Crown Cork, Air Reduction
Company, Kodak, General Dynamics, Ingersoll Rand, Worthing-
ton, Continental Can, Manpower, ITT ' s Sheraton Hotels, and
3 3Holiday Inns
.
B. NATIONALIZATION OF THE U.S. COPPER INTERESTS
There was little doubt that a battle was brewing over
the nationalization of the U.S. copper interests in Chile.
It was a foregone conclusion that Allende would nationalize
the copper industry shortly after assuming power; but, still
in question was the compensation U.S. companies would re-
ceive for their holdings. Allende hinted at the battlelines
when he declared, ''We will pay if it is just, we will not
34pay what is not just." To no one's surprise, Allende soon
stated that Kennecott and Anaconda had extracted "excess pro-





Op. Cit., Hearings, p. 378,
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deducted from any compensation to be paid them. The Cerro
Corporation was excluded because its recently opened Rio
Blanco mine had yet to show a profit..
On 11 October 1971, the Chilean Comptroller General de-
clared that Anaconda and Kennecott actually owed the Chilean
government $ 338-million . Cerro was granted a modest compen-
sation for its holdings. U.S. reaction was swift. Secretary
of State William Rogers , declared that the United States
"was deeply disappointed and disturbed" about Chile's decision
on compensation. He further warned that Chile's action might
jeopardize economic aid and the flow of private investment
funds into Chile. In rebuttal, Chile's Foreign Minister
Almeyda stated that Chile would not give in to "veiled pres-
sure" and warned that "debts contracted by the expropriated
firms," worth nearly $700-million , might be partially can-
celled in order to satisfy the $333-million deficit that
Chile claimed the companies owed. The next day, 14 October
1971, the president of Chile's State Defense Council followed
through on that warning by announcing that Chile would not
3 5pay a $250-million promisory note held by Anaconda.
On 19 January 1972, President Nixon averred that the
United States expected compensation to be "prompt, adequate
and effective," and warned "...when a country expropriates a







provision for such compensation to United States citizens,
we will presume that the United States will not extend new
bilateral economic benefits to the expropriating country
unless and until it is determined that the country is taking
reasonable steps to provide adequate compensation or rhat
there are major factors affecting United States interests
which require continuance of all or part of these benefits."
He further warned that the United States would "withhold its
support from loans under consideration in multilateral de-
3 7
velopment banks.""
The fact is that this credit squeeze, which Allende re-
ferred to as an "invisible blockade," had begun the previous
August when the Import-Export Bank denied a Chilean request
for $21-million. Foreign aid to Chile took a drastic nose-
dive from $80-million in 1969 to less than $9-million in
1971. Table XI shows the dramatic decline in funds made
available to Allende ' s Chile. Adding to these financial
difficulties , the price of copper on the world market sig-
nificantly decreased during this period. All of these fac-
tors combined to drain Chile's foreign currency reserves.
Allende announced he would try and reschedule payments
coming due on Chile's national debt, which stood at nearly












U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO CHILE 38
(U.S. Dollars, Millions; Fiscal Years)
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
96.3 30 3 26. 3 8 .6 9.0 3.8
83.5 71 15.0 - 1.5 -
12.8 9 3 11..3 8.6 7.4 3.8







World Bank (IBRD) - 11.6 19.3
International
Finance Corp. - - 10.9
Inter-American
Development Bank 16 .
5
United Nations 2 . 9
Total Inter-
national 19.4 49,0 75.4 15.4 8.5 9.4
31.9 45 .6 12 .0 2.4 5.2
5. 5 .6 3 .4 6.1 4.2
3 8
Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant
,
p. 264, University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1976.
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owed to the copper companies. This was a softer line than
some- members of the Socialist Party hoped for.
They had called for a complete repudiation of the national
debt. A compromise agreement between Chile and the ''Club of
Paris" creditor nations was reached in April of the following
year. The agreement was concluded only after Chile agreed,
* in principle, to the just compensation for all nationaliza-
tions in conformity with Chilean law and international law.
This agreement did not result in compensation to the copper
industry and was therefore never implemented by the United
States, even though it was implemented by many European
countries
.
While the U.S. government was applying official pressure,
the copper industry tried to pressure Chile through litiga-
tion in both America and Europe. In late 19 71, Kennecott
obtained a court order in Mew York blocking the bank accounts
of fourteen Chilean agencies . Kennecott then filed suit in
French court and succeeded in having an embargo placed on a
shipment of copper about to be delivered to that country
from Chile. This was followed by suits in Holland, Germany,
Sweden, and Italy. Not all of the suits were successful,
but these tactics made buyers wary and many sought their
copper elsewhere. Eventually, "all shipments of copper
were delivered to their purchasers, but the Chilean Copper




in many European countries." All of these tactics added to
the growing economic crisis in Chile.
C. NATIONALIZATION OF OTHER U.S. INTERESTS IN CHILE
The nationalization of other U.S. interests in Chile was
generally completed after direct negotiations with the U.S.
firms involved and was much less dramatic than was the case
with copper. The major exception to this pattern was ITT.
The stormy relationship between Chile and ITT will be dealt
with in a later section of this thesis since it involved a
great deal of intrigue.
In the cases of 20 U.S. companies, Allende "intervened"
in their operations in order to obtain control. He claimed
these "legal resorts" (recursos legales) were authorized by
laws passed in 1932. Intervention (temporary takeover of
management) was authorized in industries which were not func-
tioning because of labor disputes. These laws also allowed
the government to "requisition," temporarily, industries and
businesses involved in producing or distributing articles of
"basic necessity" if they ceased production or "unjustif iedly
"
produced deficiencies of those articles. Another tactic of
Allende ' s government was the manipulation of wages and prices.
By keeping prices down and raising wages, the government
39
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could bring industries "to bankruptcy or to such deep in-
debtedness to the state banking organs that takeover was sim-
ple. ...From the outset, these legal provisions - originally
intended in most cases to authorize only temporary government
takeovers of private firms - were employed by the Allende
administration to establish permanent state control of many
40
sectors of the economy."
The Chilean government negotiated with a dozen firms to
buy-out total control or majority ownership. Most of these
negotiations were conducted by the State Development Corpor-
ation (CORFO). A list of firms nationalized, intervened or
bought-out is found in Table XII .
Reactions by most of the U.S. firms dealing with Chile
at this time were more subtle than Kennecott ' s or ITT ' s
.
Many insisted on cash in advance, higher payments, special
forms of payment, or insisted on purchases of unwanted items
along with those sought. "There were many instances when
Chilean companies were frequently denied spare parts, machin-
ery, etc. from former U.S. suppliers (and from many a com-
pany in Western Europe as well) . In part as a result of
this discreet, unofficial blockade, the U.S. share of total
Chilean imports fell from 37.2 percent in 19 70 to about 10
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Cinema International (percent share unknown)
Columbia Pictures (Columbia Pictures of Chile-100%)
Corning (Cristalerias de Chile-37%)
Crown Cork (Crown Cork de Chile-100%)
Dow (Dow Quimica Chilena-100°5 , Petroquimica Dow-70i)
Ford (Ford Motor de Chile-100%)






International Chemical Fibers (Quimica Industrial-60 \ )
ITT (Chiltelco-70%, Standard Electric-100% , Guias de
Telefonos de Chile-100%)
IRECO (IRECO Chile-75%)
Textron (American Screw (Chile) -52%)
Johns Mansville ( Pizarreno-10%
Phelps Dodge (Cobre Cerrillos-majority
)
MGM (MGM de Chile- percent share unknown)
Twentieth Century Fox (Twentieth Century Fox de :hile-100s)
United Artists (United Artists South American Corporation-
percent share unknown)
Warner Brothers '(Warner Brothers, Inc . -percent share unknown)
BUY-OUTS
Anglo Lautaro ( SOQUIMICH-49%
)
Armco (Armco Chile-51% of Armco ' s 70% interest)
Bank of America (Bank of America-100%
)
Bethlehem Steel (Bethlehem Chile Iron Mines Co. -100 -a)
Coca-Cola (Embotelladora Andina-51%)
Dupont (Industrias Quimicas Dupont-100%)
First National City Bank (First National City Bank-100*)
General Motors (GM Chile-100% leased)
NIBCO (Industrias MIBSA SGM Sudamericana-50%
)
Parsons and Whittemore CCelulosas Arauco-20%) ^
RCA (RCA S.A. Electronica-share reduced from 6 6 % to 49%)
Ralston-Purina (Purina de Chile-80%)
42
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and parts, the effect of this policy was drastically felt,
especially in the mining industries. "The Chile Copper Com-
pany had agreed to buy heavy multi-million dollar trucks
from an Australian company, but the Australians reneged when
43Kennecott said would never buy from the company again."
D. U.S. MILITARY AID TO CHILE DURING THE ALLEMDE YEARS
An anomaly in this patter of denied financial assistance
was found in the area of military aid. Table XI showed the
steady growth of military assistance throughout Allende's
years in office. From the beginning of Allende's administra-
tion, there was a widespread belief in both Chile and the U.S.
that if Allende were to be overthrown or forced from office
it would be by action from or with the blessings of the armed
forces of Chile. The U.S. had been able to maintain cordial
relations with the Chilean military and wanted this relation-
ship to continue. They were encouraged when the Chilean mili-
tary refused a Soviet offer to supply $300-million in military
M-4
equipment to Chile in 19 71. Apparently, the military was
anxious not to weaken ties with the United States and Western
Europe by turning to the Soviet Union for arms. Despite the
coolness of official U.S. -Chilean relations, the United States
continued to maintain friendly relations with the Chilean
4
Op. Cit., MacEoin, p. 135,




military throughout the Allende period." If the eventual
overthrow of Allende was the ultimate aim of U.S. policy-
makers, the continuation and steady growth of military aid
to Chile appears to have been a sound and successful decision
E. CONCLUSION
There appears little room for doubt that the United States
followed an official policy of economic pressure towards Chile
It unofficially encouraged other governments , international
organizations and private businesses to join in this "invisi-
ble blockade." Certainly, such actions seemed in the best
interests of the U.S. firms whose assets in Chile were being
expropriated. Statements by President Nixon, Secretary of
State Rogers , and others ought to be accepted at face value
as being official U.S. policy. In an interview with David
Frost, Richard Nixon confirmed he personally approved the
economic squeeze against Chile. He said, "I indicated that
wherever we had a vote, where Chile was involved, that un-
less there were strong considerations on the other side that
1+6
. .
we would vote against them. " Nixon made that decision be-
fore Allende ever took office. Further enlightenment on






The New York Times , "Excerpts From Nixon Interview on
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A quick review of U.S. governmental and corporate actions
during the Allende years will show the breadth of the poli-
cies that were followed. First, the United States quickly
moved to halt economic aid to Chile. The two major exceptions
were military aid and Food for Peace, which actually increased.
Second, the United States used its influence to reduce economic
assistance to Chile from international agencies. Third, the
United States was slow to respond to debt payment reschedul-
ing negotiated through the Club of Paris. Fourth, private
lending institutions were encouraged to join this financial
blockade. Fifth, Kennecott moved to halt payments to the
Chile Copper Company through litigation in U.S. and European
courts. Sixth, U.S. suppliers demanded cash in advance or
other special forms of payment for goods sold to Chile.
Seventh, pressure was placed on other international suppliers
to demand similar payments, or preferably, not to sell to
Chile at all. Finally, much needed spare parts were not made
available or were delayed in getting to Chile
.
There is no argument that Chile's economy was in a sham-
bles at the time of the coup in 1973. The question that re-
mains unanswered is how much effect the policies of the United
States and big business had in creating that chaos. There
are those who insist that the blame rests entirely with the
United States, or at least that "United States measures con-




economy." On the other side of the coin, there are those
who insist that "united front tactics in Chile" by themselves
. . . . 43brought about "the worst economic crisis in Chilean history."
The truth probably lies somewhere in between those two posi-
tions. "Just as substantial U.S. economic assistance and
political support could not make the Frei 'revolution in
liberty' succeed, so the now documented U.S. government eco-
nomic pressures ... could not, of themselves, assure that
i+9
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IV. COVERT GOVERNMENTAL AND CORPORATE PRESSURES
Although the covert operations of the United States gov-
ernment (primarily the CIA) and multi-national corporations
(principally ITT) did not have as great an effect on the
overthrow of Allende ' s administration as the economic poli-
cies they pursued, it was these clandestine actions which,
when uncovered, received most press attention. The uncover-
ing of these activities and the attendant pejorative news
coverage brought great embarrassment to the government and
discredit to the intelligence agencies . Only now have the
"secret services" of the U.S. begun a slow return to favor
in the eyes of the public; however, they are likely never
to regain the broad power base they enjoyed prior to these
events
.
This section will examine the extent of covert operations
conducted in Chile by corporate and governmental sectors of
the United States. It will focus on the roles played by
these groups in trying to keep Allende from power, to dis-
credit him once he was in power, and the connections they
may have had to his overthrow in 19 73. There were two pri-
mary organizations whose involvement in Chile is now well-
known and fairly well documented: the Central Intelligence
Agency and International Telephone and Telegraph. The CIA
was involved purportedly for national security reasons and
ITT was motivated solely by economic considerations.
67

A. ATTEMPTS TO KEEP ALLENDE FROM OFFICE
Faced with the prospect of losing its lucrative enter-
prises in Chile, ITT began a massive campaign to keep Allende
from coming to power. Failing that, it hoped to ensure that
he remained in office less than a year. ITT claimed assets
in Chile worth $15 3 -million , involving six major affiliates
and nearly 8,000 employees. Its covert efforts to defeat
Allende were revealed by columnist Jack Anderson in 19 72.
The documents he obtained and released to the press comprised
26 confidential ITT memoranda describing the firm's efforts
to block the inauguration of Allende in late 1970. As Ander-
son declared, "These documents portray ITT as a virtual cor-
porate nation in itself with vast international holdings,
access to Washington's highest officials, its own intelligence
50
apparatus and even its own classification system."
The United States government was not idle during this
period. In 1969, the National Security Council (NSC) drafted
Memo #19 which developed a strategy for overthrowing Allende
should he come to power by using violence. Since the text
of Memo #19 has never been made public, it is difficult to
ascertain if the policies eventually followed by the U.S.
were first formulated in this document. It is interesting
to note that the NSC apparently had concluded that the
Jack Anderson, "The Washington Merry-Go-Round , " The
Washington Post
,
21 March 19 72,
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electoral system would continue to fail Allende . The exis-
tence of Memo #19 was revealed in a Senate staff report in
1974 which concluded that it was the "umbrella" under which
covert operations against Chile were authorized. Such a
policy document would have been drafted under the direction
of Henry Kissinger, who was then the National Security Advisor
to President Richard Nixon. Kissinger has been suspected
of being the author and motivator of U.S. policy towards
Chile during the Allende years. In 1970 he is alleged to
have said, "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a
country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own
i ..5 2people . "
Kissinger also chaired the "40 Committee," the National
Security Council's oversight organ which authorized all plans
and expenditures for covert activities by agencies of the
U.S. government. Although the existence of this committee
had long been reported in the press, it was not until 1974
that President Ford admitted its existence officially. The
40 Committee met on 27 June 1970 to discuss plans for Chile.
Besides Kissinger, members of this committee included the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the deputy Secretary
Laurence Stern, "Perjury Inquiry Urged on Chile Data,"
The Washington Post ,' 17 September 1974- also, Op. Cit.,
MacEoin, p. 62.
52 Seymour M. Hersh , "Censored Matter in Book About CIA




of Defense, the deputy Secretary of State, the Director of
Central Intelligence, and (until 1972) the Attorney General.
After the June meeting, CIA director Richard Helms promised
John McCone , a former head of the CIA and a member of ITT '
s
board of directors, "an expenditure of $400,000 in CIA funds
53
to assist anti-Allende news media.'' However, the CIA turned
down an ITT request "that it channel a 'substantial' sum in
ITT funds to the Alessandri campaign, but it (gave) the com-
pany advice on how to pass $350,000 of its own money and an
equal amount from other companies (including Anaconda) to the
54
candidate and the parties backing him."
After Allende's victory (4 September 19 70), the 40 Com-
mittee met again on 8 September to discuss what actions
should be taken in response to the election. The likelihood
that Allende's election would be ratified by the Chilean
Congress and the unlikely intervention of the military were
discussed. J. D. Neal , ITT's director of international re-
lations, telephoned Viron Vaky, an assistant to Henry Kissin-
ger, renewing the contact between the corporation and the
government on 13 September. In a memorandum dated the fol-
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William R. Merriam, vice-president in charge of ITT ' s Wash-
ington office. Meal reportedly told Vaky that ITT's presi-
dent and chairman of the board, Harold 3. Geneen, was
interested in coming to Washington to discuss the company's
concern about events in Chile and that the company was will-
ing to "assist financially in sums up to seven figures" any
program aimed at thwarting Allende . Vaky promised to pass
Neal ' s message along to Kissinger and "offered to keep (ITT)
informed.
"
On that same day (14 September) the 40 Committee again
met in secret session. William Colby later told a House
Armed Services Subcommittee that at this meeting $350,000
was authorized "to bribe members of the Chilean Parliament.
However the money was never spent. The committee also de-
cided to instruct the ambassador to Chile, Edward M. Korry
,
to try and pursuade President Frei to make arrangements to
prevent Allende 's assuming the presidency. Korry reported
back that he told Frei that if Allende were elected "not a
nut or a bolt" would be allowed to reach Chile and that the
United States would do everything in its power to "condemn
„S6
Stanley Karnow , "ITT's Chile Caper," The Washington
Post
,
27 March 1972. (Unless otherwise noted, all citations
from ITT memoranda or notes are from this source.)
Philip Shabecoff, "President Publicly . Backs Clandestine





57Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty."
Two days later in Chicago, Kissinger declared that ''an Allende
takeover in Chile would present massive problems for us, and
indeed to the whole Western Hemisphere."
Meanwhile ITT began receiving field reports from an oper-
ative in Latin America, Robert Berrellez, a long-time Assoc-
iated Press reporter in Latin American then serving ITT in
Buenos Aires. He relayed his reports through Harold Hendrix
,
a former Scripps-Howard reporter in Latin America, then sta-
tioned by ITT in New York. A memorandum on 17 September to
E. J. Gerrity, a senior vice-president for ITT, claimed that
Ambassador Korry had received on 15 September (one day after
the 40 Committee had met) a message from the State Department
"giving him the green light to move in the name of President
Nixon." He was supposedly instructed "to do all possible -
short of a Dominican Republic-type action - to keep Allende
from taking power." Failing to win Frei over with his eco-
nomic threats, one U.S. critic pointed out that Korry and
the State Department "opted for a low profile
,
presumably
satisfied that the objective would be more easily secured by
5 8letting CAllende) turn for a time slowly in the wind."
The off icially- stated policy of the U,S, towards Chile
was tolerance and non-interference, a far-cry from what
57 Laurence Stern, "Contradictions on Chile," The Washing -
Post
,




, MacEoin, p. 63.
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turned out to be official U.S. policy. Far more serious
assertions by Berrellez and Hendrix were that the military
had been offered "full material and financial assistance by
the U.S. military establishment." This was being reported
at the same time that Ambassador Korry was reporting that
"opportunities for significant U.S. government action with
the Chilean military are non-existent," and the CIA agreed
that "military action is impossible; the military is incapable
and unwilling to seize power. We have no capability to moti-
59
vate or instigate a coup." Berrellez and Hendrix also pro-
posed a campaign of propaganda and advertising against Allende
in leading Chilean and Latin American newspapers
.
On 21 September, Neal sent a memorandum to Merriam prais-
ing the Berrellez and Hendrix memo and stating that he had
contacted a State Department official, John Fisher, and ad-
vised him that ITT was "ready to see anyone or do anything
possible." The next day Gerrity cabled Geneen, who was in
Europe, and recommended that the company pursue the "strategy"
put forth by Berrellez and Hendrix aa the "best course to be
followed." Gerrity also reported that Merriam had made con-
tact with "the man you introduced him (to) some months ago."
The "man" later proved to be William V. Broe , the director
of the CIA's Latin American division of Clandestine Services.
In a longer cable on 29 September, Gerrity reported that the
59
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"man" had put forth a plan aimed at causing social unrest,
economic chaos and giving the military the pretext needed to
stage a coup. Gerrity said he did "not necessarily agree"
with the plan. Involved in the plan were many of the eco-
nomic sanctions discussed in the previous section of this
thesis. An internal ITT memo from Gerrity to other executives
dated the next day, disclosed that Geneen also felt that
Broe ' s suggestions were "not workable." Gerrity further re-
ported that the CIA had been advised by a representative of
Alessandri in Chile that for the moment the best course of
action to follow was to "keep cool, don't rock the boat, we
are making progress." Gerrity noted that this was "in dir-
ect contrast to what Broe recommended."
From his position in Latin America, Berrellez felt that
nothing was being done. He telephoned Hendrix in New York
on 29 September and reported, "A more realistic hope among
those who want to block Allende is that a swiftly deterior-
ating economy ... will touch off a wave of violence, resul-
ting in a military coup." He had apparenxly realized that
a propaganda campaign was not sufficient to block Allende.
Berrellez' insistence that there was hope of a military in-
tervention was not reflected elsewhere. Berrellez, "known
among foreign correspondents in Latin America for having
held highly conservative opinions about Latin American poli-
tics," may have optimistically reported what he wanted to
74

believe rather than what really was. Berrellez cautiously
added to his report that "every care should be exercised to
insure that we are not - repeat are not - identified with
any anti-Allende move." Neal reflected Berrellez' disap-
pointment with U.S. actions when he wrote the next day in
a memo to Merriam, "Why should the United States try to be
so pious and sanctimonious in September and October when
over the past few years it has been pouring the taxpayer's
money into Chile, admittedly to defeat Marxism? Why can't
the fight be continued now that the battle is in the home-
stretch and the enemy is more clearly identifiable?"
Merriam expressed a similar tone of disappointment a
week later (7 October) in a note to Gerrity when he pointed
out that "everyone foresees an Allende victory in Congress
unless some last minute miracle takes place." He also took
the opportunity to knock the State Department by pointing
out that Assistant Secretary of State Charles Meyer was
leaving for a week in the Caribbean "while Santiage burns!"
Two days later Merriam wrote McCone giving a synopsis of
the Chilean situation and asserting that he had learned from
the CIA that "approaches continue to be made to select mem-
bers of the (Chilean) armed forces in an attempt to have
60Lewis H. Diuguid, "ITT's View of Chile: How Accurate
the Picture," The Washington Post
,
2 3 March 1972.






them lead aocie sort of uprising." This was a startling
revelation when one considers that less than a week later
ITT ' s own sources reported that General Roberto Viaux had
been told by Washington to "hold back" on a coup he was re-
portedly primed to launch. As shall be pointed out, the
very existence of CIA overtures to the military was a close-
ly held secret.
J. D. Neal visited with Ambassador Kerry while
the latter was in Washington for consultations. Ke reported
on 15 October that Kerry was having difficulty convincing
the administration to halt "every possible assistance," and
that he advised Geneen to forward "any ideas about U.S.
policy toward Allende's government" to the White House "im-
mediately." The next day Hendrix informed his superiors
that General Viaux was advised from Washington not to launch
a coup because they felt "he was not adequately prepared"
and his attempt could end up as "a Bay of Pigs in Chile."
Washington had probably gotten cold feet after receiving
persistent messages from Ambassador Kerry that any military
coup would be disastrous. Korry had informed the State
Department on 2 5 September that he was "convinced we cannot
provoke a military coup" and that he had "instructed our
military and (the CIA) not to engage in encouragement of
any kind." On the 9th of October he used even stronger
language insisting that any military intervention would
bring "an unrelieved disaster for the U.S. and for the
76

President." Korry sent his messages because he believed the
CIA was "up to something behind my back," and he was right.
At a meeting at the White House on 15 September, Richard
Nixon declared that "an Allende regime in Chile would not be
acceptable to the United States." A plan was formulated
at this meeting known as "Track II" whose sole objective was
the promotion of a military coup. In attendance at the meet-
ing with President Nixon were: Henry Kissinger, John Mitchell,
and Richard Helms. Helms was offered $10-million to carry
out the program and he later reported, "If I ever carried a
marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it
was that day." Six days later the Santiago CIA chief received
word that "a military solution" was the "objective." The
message also stated that the CIA was "explicitly told that
the 40 Committee, State, Ambassador, and Embassy were not to
64-
be told of this Track II or involved in any manner." CIA
overtures to the military, as expected, were not successful.
One important development during this period was the forma-
tion of the ultra-rightest Fatherland and Liberty party (Pat-
ria y Libertad) by Pablo Rodriguez Grez. Some $38,500 were
Op. Cit
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funneled to the Fatherland and Liberty organization as part
of the Track II effort. Hendrix's October 16th memorandum
noted that "as part of the persuasion to delay (his coup),
Viaux was given oral assurances he would receive material
assistance and support from the U.S. and others for a later
maneuver." He also noted that Chile "was now swarming with
CIA agents.
"
A 20 October letter from Gerrity to Geneen suggested
that in the event of Allende ' s election the government should
invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment, which calls for cutting
off all aid to countries that nationalize U.S. firms with-
out compensation. He also wrote that same day to McCone
suggesting Viaux might yet stage a coup before the Congres-
sional election. Two days later the commander-in-chief of
Chile's army, Rene Schneider, was assassinated during a
kidnap attempt. Viaux was arrested and convicted, ending
any chance of his staging a coup. Records indicate that
Viaux 's arrest ended any serious attempt by the U.S. to
encourage or promote a military overthrow. That same day
Merriam wrote Gerrity advising him that economic pressure
now seemed the best course to follow and that he would be
contacting the majority and minority leaders of the Senate,
Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott, to urge their support. Fin-







Merriam noted that "every possible pressure which might
keep Dr. Allende in bounds" must be applied. He then pro-
posed an economic program to be followed in Chile. He for-
warded a copy of this program to Henry Kissinger the next
day. Kissinger responded a week later, saying, "It is very
helpful to have your thoughts and recommendations, and we
shall certainly take them into account." Some thought this
a cool response , but Merriam forwarded the note to Gerrity
adding, "Believe this to be more than perfunctory. Things
are brewing on the Chile matter and will be back to you
later on that subject." Kissinger had already adopted a
strategy towards Chile nearly identical to that suggested
by Merriam.
The following day (24 October) Allende T s election was
confirmed by the Chilean Congress. All of the intrigues
and plots had failed to keep him from office. One govern-
ment source noted, "There was a range of alternatives being
considered. The options ranged from a marine-type invasion
to massive infusions of money. When Allende became Presi-
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B. DESTABILIZATION OF THE ALLENDE REGIME
It became immediately apparent that normal relations
with Chile would not continue. President Nixon refrained
from sending the routine congratulatory message to the Pres-
ident-elect. The large corporations also realized that they
would have to alter their modes of operation in Chile. An
organization was established by Anaconda to formulate a
common policy for dealing with Allende. Joining Anaconda
in this group were: ITT, with Merriam as its representative,
Kennecott , Grace, Pfizer, Ralston-Purina , and Bank of Ameri-
ca. Credit withholding from Chile started immediately;
but, the State Department and the multinationals adopted a
wait-and-see attitude for the most part. Only the Cenrral
Intelligence Agency continued its operations without
interruption
.
Details of CIA activity in Chile from 197G to 1973 were
first provided to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on
Intelligence by CIA director William E. Colby in April 19 74.
The head of this subcommittee, Michigan Democrat Lucien N.
Nedzi, made the transcript of Colby's testimony available
to the liberal Democratic representative from Massachusetts,
Michael J. Harrington. A long-time critic of the Central
Intelligence Agency, Harrington wrote letters protesting the
68
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CIA's activities to other members of Congress, including
the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Thomas
E. Morgan. A copy of this letter to Morgan was leaked by
69Harrington to the Press in September 1974. The letter
detailed some of the specific authorizations that had been
granted to the CIA during the years in question.
The most widely publicized revelation out of Harrington's
letter was the fact that the 40 Committee had authorized
$8-million for clandestine activities in Chile since 1969.
Washington sources indicated that about $7-million of the
70
authorized funds were actually spent. Harrington's letter
stated that these funds included $5-million intended for
71
"destabilization activities." Colby explicitly denied
that "the word 'destabilize' in whatever grammatical form"
appeared anywhere in his testimony. He added that such an
accusation was "not a fair description of our national
72policy from 1971 on." Exactly what our national policy
69 Seymour M. Hersh, "CIA Chief Tells House of $3-Million
Campaign Against Chile in '70- '73," The New York Times
,
8 September 19 74.
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was is not certain in spite of the wealth of information
available on the subject. The CIA seemed bent on a course that
would undermine Allende's popular support; however, the
State Department, at first, seemed willing to work with
Allende.
Ambassador Korry said the United States pursued "an
extraordinarily soft line" with Allende during his first
year in office. In fact, the Ambassador reported having
offered Allende "an incredibly generous economic package"
in mid-summer 1971. The offer included the underwriting
of low-interest Chilean bonds by the United States with
"the full faith and credit of the American Treasury, if
the Allende regime would negotiate a settlement with ITT
7 3
and the two copper companies (Anaconda and Kennecott)."
He said he made the offer "in my name only" and without the
knowledge of the companies concerned. Prior to making the
offer, Korry had obtained separate approvals from Rogers
and Kissinger, and he carried a personal letter from Rogers
to Chilean Foreign Minister, Cladomiro Almeyda, supportive
of the proposal. Korry says the offer "was not motivated
so much by the desire for compensation" as it was to avoid
having to pay millions of dollars from the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), the U.S. governmental agency
The Miami Herald
,
"'Generous' Offer to Allende by U .
S
in '70 Disclosed," 19 September 1974.
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which insures private investors against expropriation.
74
Allende rejected the offer for "ideological reasons."
The New York Times , in a 16 September 1974 editorial,
asked:
Are we to believe that Ambassador Korry and the
State Department were endeavoring to stabilize
Dr. Allende ' s Government while the CIA was trying
to "destabilize" it? Could the American Ambassa-
dor in Santiago and the Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs have been ignor-
ant of what the CIA was doing - or was the CIA in
truth a law unto itself?
The United States had long operated its covert activities in
such a manner that the President and State Department could
plausibly deny knowledge of their existence. In this case,
it may have been the truth. The animosity between Kissinger
and the State Department was well-known and Richard Helms
testified that the State Department and the Ambassador were
not told about Track II programs.
The $8-million authorized by the 4-0 Committee was not
approved all at once; rather, it was approved at a series of
meetings beginning with the one in June 1970. Other meet-
ings were held in September 1970, November and December 1971,
75April 1972 and August 197 3. President Ford, in an unpre-
cedented news conference, admitted the United States
74 Edward M. Korry, "Ambassador Korry on a 19 71 Proposal












clandestine intervention in Chile. He asserted that the
effort was mounted to "help and assist the preservation of
opposition newspaper, electronic media and to preserve op-
position political parties."
7 Exactly how the CIA's funds
were spent is not known.
Evidence indicates that the CIA funds were spent in
three different areas. One area, as President Ford noted,
was the support of opposition newspapers and radio stations
in Chile. Allende supporters contend there was no reason
to assist the media since under his administration "no gov-
7 7
ernment censorship of the press was established." Allende '
s
detractors painted a much grimmer picture. They pointed
out that attacks on the media "were rarely frontal and overt.
They were nearly always financial in seme way. And ... were
7 8
almost never as heavyhanded as censorship." Just three
months after Allende assumed office, the government acquired
a monopoly in Chile of slick-paper magazine and book pub-
lishing. They were able to take control through a series
of leftist-controlled strikes and a Communist-directed
76
Los Angeles Times , "U.S. Intervened in Chile, Ford
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Tom Wicker, "Was Ford Conned On Chile?" The New York
Times , 20 September 1974.
78 David F. Belnap , "Allende Attempted to Quash All
Opposition," Los Angeles Times, 2 7 September 19 74.
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arbitration which left the paper distribution company the
choice of giving in or going broke. The government used
similar tactics in an attempt to gain control over the com-
pany which supplied most of Chile's newsprint. Unable to
purchase shares from the company's 16,000 shareholders, the
government tried to force the company into bankruptcy by
controlling prices and increasing wages. The company lost
79$9
.
1-million during a twelve-month period. The reason
the stock purchase method did not work was that a "fund for
o n
liberty" had been established (possibly with some CIA
funding) that outbid the government or provided an alter-
native place for people to sell their shares.
The government's most effective tool for applying pres-
sure was advertising. As Chile's largest advertiser, the
government could channel a majority of its business to radio
stations and newspapers sympathetic to its policies. As the
government took over more and more businesses, the private
sector's advertising began to dry up. 3y the end of 1371,
El Mercuric
,
the nation's largest newspaper and an anti-
Allende publication, had lost 6 percent of its normal volume











loss of 30 percent. Closures of radio stations that the
government claimed "endangered national security" became a
8 2
"common occurence" under the Allende government. Facing
that sort of pressure, there was genuine concern about how
long some of the opposition media could survive.
The second largest area of reported financial support,
and possibly the largest area of funding, was the backing
of "gremios" or interest groups. The gremios included such
groups as trade unions, occupational associations (such as
truckers, shopkeepers, doctors, lawyers, etc.), and some
sectors of the peasantry. "Intelligence sources" have in-
sisted "that the majority" of the $8-million given to the
CIA "was used in 1372 and 1973 to provide strike benefits
and other means of support for the anti-Allende strikers
8 3
and workers."' Starting in late-1971 and continuing to
just prior to Allende' s overthrow, a series of mass mobili-
zations by the right kept Chile's economy in turmoil. The
peaks of these demonstrations were in December 1971, March,
84October 1972, May, June and August 197 3. Although there
8
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is no direct evidence that CIA funds were used to finance
these strikes, there is indirect corroboration of outside
financing. During Allende's three years in power, the
black market value of the dollar continued to rise substan-
tially, except during the "bosses strike" in October 1972
and the August 197 3 disruptions, when it actually fell.
There was an obvious influx of dollars to the black market
during these periods
.
Without question, money alone could not have spawned
the massive demonstrations that took place in Chile. Ap-
parently the CIA offered other kinds of assistance as well
as financial support. An article in the Sunday Times
claimed that "108 Chileans from the gremios and unions were
trained" at the American Institute for Free Labor Develop-
86
ment (AIFLD) school in Front Royal, Virginia. A former
CIA agent claimed that AIFLD was a "CIA-controlled" front
8 7for "covering trade-union organizing activity." As one
official in the U.S. government remarked, "What we really
were doing was supporting a civilian resistance movement
8 8

















that $8-million is a minimal amount to finance such an
undertaking. Evidence, such as that cited above, indicates
that most of that money was converted on the black market
at rates up to 800 percent higher than the official rate.
In other words, the CIA's funds could have had a local im-
89pact in Chile of more than $U0-million.
The final area into which CIA funds were channeled was
the extreme right, principally the Fatherland and Liberty
party. Representative Harrington made note of the $38,500
given to the party as part of Track II and claimed that
90the CIA "continued payments for at least another year."
Other "highly reliable sources" claimed that an executive
assistant of Kissinger's, Lawrence Eagleburger, leaked
three documents covering meetings of the 40 Committee be-
tween 19 7 and 19 7 3 showing that funds which may have been
destined ultimately for the Patria y Libertad were requested
as late as July 1973. The funds were ostensibly requested
for support of the National Party, which was "known to have
91
close ties to Patria y Libertad." The CIA was rumored
to have direct ties with the party as well. An outspoken
Ibid.
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critic of the U.S. claimed that Keith W. Wheelock, a sec-
retary in the U.S. embassy in Chile at that time, was the
CIA's contact with Patria y Libertad. He claimed the CIA's
embassy "team" included: Joseph F. Manus , Daniel Arzac,
Dean Hinton , Frederick Lastrash, Keith Wheelock, Arnold




son, and John B. Tnpton. Stanford professor Richard
Fagen supported the assertion that the CIA had a large em-
bassy contingent. He said he was approached by the CIA
while serving as a consultant in Chile for the Ford Founda-
tion during 1972-73 and asked to be a contact. It was
hoped his university connections might provide links for
infiltrating the Movement of the Revolutionary Left - the
only leftist group the CIA had failed to penetrate. Fagen
refused the request but said he was told "about one-third
93
of the total" embassy staff were really CIA agents. No
one will ever know exactly how much effect CIA activity had
on events that led to the coup d'etat that toppled the
Allende administration, but one official described U.S.
policy as a total failure, "We were not looking for a
92 Robinson Ro]as Sandford, The Murder of Allende
,
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93 .Richard R. Fagen, "The Intrigues Before Allende Fell,"




military takeover." A further discussion of this point is
found in the concluding section of this chapter.
While the CIA was busy in Chile, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation became involved in Washington. In mid-April
1971, the Agency requested the Bureau to install "eavesdrop-
ping equipment" in the Chilean embassy. FBI director J. Edgar
Hoover initially refused. A few days later, Attorney General
John Mitchell, at the behest of the CIA, reversed Hoover's
decision and ordered the bugs installed. The bugging was
halted in February 1972 when Hoover threatened to "blow the
whistle." Hoover died in May 197 2 and the eavesdropping op-
eration was reinstituted in December of that same year. When
the bugging operation ceased is not known, but "they may have
q 5been turned off ... in February 1973. ""
C. THE OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE
There was little doubt in anyone's mind that Allende was
about to be forced from power. General Carlos Prats, having
lost control over the armed forces, tendered his resignation
as commander-in-chief of the army. He presumably wanted to
alienate himself from the coup he knew was coming . In a
94
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9 5 George Lardner , Jr., "FBI Bugging Of Chilean Offices
Told," The Washington Post, 12 November 1976.
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letter addressed to General Prats a few days before the coup,
Radomiro Tomic . the Christian Democratic candidate for presi-
dent in 1970, expressed his sorrow about the inevitable:
As in the tragedies of Greek classical theater, all
know what will happen, all do not wish it to occur,
but each one does precisely what is necessary to
provoke the unfortunate outcome everyone pretends
to avoid.
In this section, the United States' connections with the coup
and those who planned and executed it will be examined.
It has been charged that the coup d'etat was the final
act of the CIA's "clandestine war against a theoretically
9 7
friendly government." The facts, however, do not support
this contention. It is widely held in most sectors that the
United States had no role in planning or executing the coup.
Facts supporting both arguments, however, will be presented
within the text of the discussion A Senate staff report
noted that Kissinger "must have known that expending funds
for the express purpose of creating political destabilization
had to enhance the possibility, indeed the probability of
B , i - 98the coup whxch, m fact, took place.
There are those who insist the United States had a hands-
off policy with the Chilean military starting in 1969 j however,
96
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this claim has been widely discredited and most sources agree
that it was not until the spring of 1973 that contact with
the Chilean military was actually broken off. It appears
that the primary contacts between the United States and Chile
took place directly between navies . An article in the Sunday
Times reported that the U.S. Marine attache, Lieutenant Colo-
nel Patrick Ryan, was in liaison with Admiral Turibio Merino,
the senior naval officer in Valparaiso, over preparations for
99the coup. General Prats also asserted that the ''coordina-
tion and preparation" for the coup took place mainly in Val-
paraiso between the navy and U.S. officials. When the
coup actually began, it was the navy that rebelled first on
the morning of 11 September.
The Sunday Times article asserted that there were three
principal reasons why U.S. naval intelligence played a main
role in pre-coup planning. First, it claimed that in the
late 1960s special secure communications networks were estab-
lished with Latin American navies . That meant the Chilean
navy could communicate directly with the U.S. navy without
fear of detection. Second, the article points out the tra-
ditionally close ties the two navies enjoy. And third, which
may be coincidental, the joint exercise known as Unitas was
99
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scheduled to begin on 11 September. In the film entitled
"The Battle of Chile," it was asserted that "U.S. intelli-
gence officers" were aboard every Chilean vessel participating
in the coup and that U.S. ships "were in direct communication
with the coupmakers" throughout the attack. Those asser-
tions are interesting but not documented, nor are they re-
peated in any of the numerous volumes dealing with the coup.
The Chilean navy was also rumored to have direct CIA contact.
Early in his term, Allende pushed for the retirement of the
Chilean naval attache in Washington, Rear Admiral Victor
/ 10 2Bunster del Solar, allegedly because he was a ClA contact.
Adding credence to the argument that the U.S. navy was
in touch with the Chilean navy, the U.S. vessels scheduled
for participation in the Unitas exercise remained outside of
Chilean territorial waters just prior to the coup. The four
ships, USS Richmond K. Turner
,
USS Tattnall . USS Vesoie , and
USS Clamagore
,
were purportedly directed to remain alert but
outside of Chilean waters by Admiral Merino. The admini-
strations explanation is more than likely closer to the truth.
The government admitted it was told unofficially of the ..
Lewis H. Diuguid, "The Seesaw State of Salvador Al-
lende ' s Third Year of Rule," The Washington Post , 19 April 1973
102 Frederick M. Nunn , The Military m Chilean History
,









impending coup but that such warnings had been frequent during
104
the preceding ten months. As a matter of prudence, the
administration said it ordered the ships to remain outside
Chilean waters and await further instructions. The U.S.
stiffly denied complicity with the junta or encouragement of
the coup in any way. The new junta confirmed the fact that
they deliberately kept Washington in the dark "to prevent any
possibility of United States involvement in the overthrow
It appears that the coup was primarily planned by the
Chilean navy; yet, in post-coup interviews each of the ser-
vice chiefs gave the impression that the plan was primarily
his. Admiral Merino said he finally decided to rebel on the
10th of September and sent a secret message with an aide in-
10 6forming the other two service chiefs . According to Gen-
eral Leigh's version of what happened, he initiated the coup
by contacting Pinochet on 9 September after hearing a broad-
cast by Carlos Altamirano . Altamirano called for a new eco-
nomic structure and military participation in the government 107
104Ronald J. Ostrow, "CIA Kept Out of Plot on Allende
,
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Pinochet, of course, insisted the plan was entirely his and
that he did not tell anyone in the air force or navy, fearing
they were infiltrated by pro-Allende men. He did admit he
was visited by Leigh and Merino on 9 September and that they
encouraged him to move his attack from 14 September to 11
i n r
September. General Prats said he was "convinced that
(Pinochet) joined the bandwagon of the coupmakers only at the
109last minute." Regardless of who planned the coup, it was
a well-thought out , well-executed plan. Launched in the early
hours of 11 September, by 1330 that afternoon the coup was
over, the presidential palace in flames, and Allende dead.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The extent to which the intrigues of government and cor-
porate interests contributed to the fall of Allende ' s govern-
ment may never be known. That they were factors in his
downfall cannot be questioned. It should be remembered, how-
ever, that no ruling class in history has given up its privi-
leges peacefully. Chile, with or without outside aid, was
no exception to this rule. The question which should be ad-
dressed is: What were the goals of U.S. policy and were they
successfully obtained?
10 8
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An experienced intelligence executive once observed, "The
use of 'covert action' for the implementation of foreign poli-
cy may be even counterproductive when successful; when un-
successful it can be catastrophic." It is still unclear
whether the United States feels its policies were successful
or unsuccessful. As stated by President Ford, Henry Kissin-
ger, and William Colby, our goal in Chile was not a military
coup, whatever else it might it have been. Kissinger, the
"architect" of U.S. Chile policy, stated, "Our concern was
with the election of 1976 and not at all about the coup that
occurred in 19 73." And Colby agreed, having stated, "We
wanted to sustain their forces until the 1976 election, but
because of Allende ' s oppressive policies, the military final-
112ly moved, but this was not a CIA action."
By whatever measure one wishes to use, U.S. Chile policy
was unsuccessful in reaching of ficially-srated U.S. goals .
If the U.S. desired to preserve the opposition news media and
parties as President Ford stated, it failed. The military
junta subsequently banned all political parties and censored
the press. If the U.S. desired to preserve democracy until
1976, as stated by Kissinger and Colby, it failed. There
The New York Times
,
editorial, quoting Lyman B. Kirk-
patrick, 20 September 1974.










have been no elections in Chile since the coup, except for
a plebiscite the U.S. said was unacceptable.
Yet one does not sense that the U.S. feels its Chile poli-
cy was a total failure at all. President Mixon probably
summed it up best when he observed that the junta "are non-
113Communist, and ... are not enemies of the United States."
William Colby admitted the U.S. "did look forward to a change
114
of government" in Chile. A quick summary of the actions
taken by the government and private sectors of the U.S. will
help show the magnitude of expression this desire for
a new government was given. First it was decided to insti-
tute all of the economic sanctions listed in the previous
chapter. U.S. business grouped together to try and defeat
Allende ' s election, spending some $750,000 for this purpose.
ITT went even further when, in concert with the CIA, it en-
couraged a coup by General Viaux to halt Allende' s inaugura-
tion. After he was elected and sworn in, the CIA followed
a deliberate path aimed at creating economic chaos and social
unrest through support of strikes and demonstrations. All
told, $7-million was spent between 1970-1973 in this effort.
There is no available evidence to support the accusation that
the U.S. helped plan and execute the coup, but there is little
113
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doubt U.S. efforts helped spawn the conditions which led to
the coup.
After U.S. efforts in Chile had been leaked to the press,
first by Jack Anderson and then by Representative Harrington,
the U.S. intelligence agencies were largely discredited.
Henry Kissinger, known more for his wit than for his straight
answers , implied that no one in the administration was really
"that concerned" about events in Chile. He quipped, "Chile
is a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica." Data
indicate that the administration was concerned about Chile,
but probably not for obvious reasons. Kissinger's concern
about the so-called Euro-Communists in Italy, France, Spain
and Portugal was well known, and it was probably the concern
- that a successful popular front government in Chile would
encourage similar movements within the NATO alliance - that
motivated his involvement.
One final point to be emphasized, before leaving the dis-
cussion of covert actions, is that there may yet be places
for covert actions in the intelligence and foreign relations
fields . So far they have shown little continuous benefit
for the price they seem always to exact . But as William
Colby pointed out, "I think it would be mistaken to deprive
our nation of the possibility of some moderate covert action
Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Chile, the CIA and Kissinger,"
The Washington Post
,




response to a foreign problem and leave us with nothing be-
ll 6
tween diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines."
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United States' relations with Chile during Allende's years
provide a unique laboratory for studying the effects of overt
and covert foreign policy implementation . They also under-
score the danger implicit in the use of covert actions by a
democratic nation. This section will summarize and analyze
the information presented, and then apply it in support of
or against the hypothesis underlying this study, which is:
the U.S. government, in concert with large U.S. -owned corpor-
ations, systematically moved to ensure the failure of Allende's
Marxist regime.
The first section presented highlights and a brief chrono-
logy of modern Chilean politics from just before the turn of
the century through Allende's years in power. Most notable
in the last years preceding the coup were the polarization of
Chilean society and the formation of extremist groups , both
right and left. Allende lit a fire he was helpless to con-
trol or quench; a fire which the United States helped fuel
with economic and covert pressure. Regardless of the extent
of United States' interference, which was enormous, many
Chileans had no difficulty "in finding sufficient cause for
the regime's end in the disastrous repercussions of the re-
117gime ' s own policies." In the aftermath of revelations
117
Op. Cit., Hearings, p. 224
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concerning ITT and the CIA, Allende ' s economic and social
policies seem to have been forgotten. Allende received no
mandate with his narrow plurality; yet, he proceeded as if
he had won by a landslide. Although a majority president has
been the exception rather than the rule in Chilean elections
(a fact Allende's supporters are quick to point out), other
minority presidents have, by and large, represented a por-
tion of the ruling oligarchy and pursued programs within the
framework of the status quo. It is again worth noting that
no ruling oligarchy has ever peacefully given up its privi-
leges. Since this thesis was not primarily focused upon
internal Chilean politics, no in-depth presentation was made.
The purpose of the brief discussion which was presented was
to remind the reader that the United States was not acting
within a political vacuum in Chile; rather, it used the poli-
tical forces in Chile for its own ends.
The second section dealt with the widespread criticism,
both in this country and abroad, of the U.S. press in dealing
with Allende. It was assumed that the government and cor-
porations desiring to be rid of Allende would push for a
massive propaganda campaign justifying their actions against
him. The evidence indicated no significant difference in
U.S. newspaper reporting compared to coverage by The Times
(London). All major newspapers reported more negative news
than positive news and they tended to label Allende a Marx-
ist early in news reports, if they labeled him at all. In
101

later sections it was shown that there was, in fact, a major
propaganda campaign, but that it was conducted in Chile and
elsewhere in Latin America, not in the U.S. press. Even a
casual perusal of the newspapers in the past few years will
show that the U.S. press has been more critical of the junta
than they were of Allende.
The economic boycott, or invisible blockade, was discuss-
ed in the third section. Officially the policy included the
denial of credit, the stopping of foreign aid, and reluctance
to renegotiate debt payments with Chile. The only exceptions
to this policy were military aid and the Food for Peace pro-
grams, which actually increased. Unofficially, the policy
included denial of credit by private lending institutions
,
stringent payment requirements for imports into Chile, denial
of spare parts, pressure on foreign governments and corpora-
tions not to deal with Chile, costly litigations and embargo
of copper shipments to Europe. The invisible blockade was
the most effective policy the U.S. followed in bringing pres-
sure and disruption to the Chilean economy. It was this eco-
nomic pressure which brought the greatest protests from Al-
lende himself. Ultimately, it was the chaotic state of the
Chilean economy that caused the military to move against the
Unidad Popular and overthrow Allende
.
Corporate and governmental covert actions against Chile
were discussed next. Even though these efforts had only a
minimal effect in Chile, the effect of these policies in the
102

United States were major and longlasting . Press leakage of
secret CIA activities, on the heels of the leaked Pentagon
Papers, opened the floodgates that continue to fill the press
with sensitive information. The press made folk heroes out
of the likes of Daniel Ellsberg and Michael Harrington. What
seemed at first to be a minor concern and a matter of consci-
ence, has turned into a major problem of national security.
The resultant mistrust of the intelligence community has been
relected in tighter budgets and cries for greater control.
In Chile the effects were less visible. Efforts by rhe CIA
and ITT to prevent Allende's election were total failures.
Early attempts to foment a coup ended similarly. The most
effective use of CIA funds, estimated at $8-million, was in
the support of strikes and other disruptions that had a deva-
stating; effect on the economy. These strikes, however, were
not a result of the availability of CIA funding; rather, funds
were made available after the strikes had begun. Since these
funds were inserted covertly into the Chilean economy, they
were exchanged on the black market at rates up to 300 percent
more than the official exchange rate. CIA funds were also
used for support of opposition political parties and news
media, and to support efforts to block government takeover
of some industries. The most controversial use of CIA monies
was the support of the extreme right-wing group Patria y
Libertad which openly called for the military overthrow of
Allende's regime. Without the complementary aspects of the
103

invisible blockade, it is doubtful that the CIA funds could,
by themselves, have brought on a crisis in the Chilean econ-
omy. In testimony before a House Subcommittee, Dr. Henry A.
118
Landsberger stated:
I think one needs to be clear at the outset that
no historical event of importance - and the fall
of President Allende's government is an event of
importance - has ever occurred for a single rea-
son, and... it has never occurred out of foreign
money reasons
.
In other words , the CIA took advantage of what happened rather
than instigating what happened
President Ford declared that "the effort that was made
in (Chile) was to help assist the preservation of opposition
newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition
political parties . " That statement is true as far as he took
it, but he could have said much more. The most controversial
part of his statement continued, "I think this is in the best
interest of the people in Chile, and certainly in our best
119interest." * ' It remains to be seen if the events that ac-
tually transpired are in the best interests of the Chileans,
but he was probably correct when he declared that these actions
were in the best interest of the United States. The most
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spectator to events that threaten to alter the balance of
power; to do so would be to commit slow suicide. What needs
highlighting is that the overt policies of the U.S. had the
greatest effect in obtaining the desired result - hurting
Chile's economy. The benefits derived from covert actions
were not worth the political price paid for them. In a Final
Report of a Senate Select Committee, the following conclusions
A K 4- 120were drawn about covert actions:
Reliance on covert action has been excessive be-
cause it offers a secret shortcut around the demo-
cratic process. ...Secrecy has been a tragic
conceit. Inevitably, the truth prevails, and
policies pursued on the premise that they could
be plausibly denied, in the end damage America's
reputation and the faith of her people in their
government
.
Total repudiation of covert actions, however, could have
tragic results. America must keep options open to it that
allow a wide range of responses to the many and varied poli-
tical situations it will have to confront.
The final part of this thesis dealt with the U.S. involve-
ment in the coup that actually overthrew Allende. All indi-
cations are that the coup was planned and executed by Chileans
.
Undoubtedly, the U.S. helped spawn the conditions which gave
the military the pretext on which to act, but no actual in-
volvement has ever been verified in unclassified literature.
120United States Senate, Foreign and Military Intelligence
,
Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, p. 16,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.
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Regardless of that, Allende's fall will undoubtedly join the
overthrows of Mossadegh in Iran and Arbenz in Guatemala as a
government toppled by the CIA.
The people of the United States have become cynical of
their politicians and institutions. Clear national goals
have been diffused by the waffling rhetoric of powerful poli-
tical leaders. For each stand that is taken, a dozen excep-
tions are made in the name of detente and good will. America
has retreated from the ideal espoused by President Kennedy
in his inaugural address: "We shall pay any price, bear any
burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe,
in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty."
America needs a clear direction and forceful leadership. With
its feet on the ground and its eyes on the stars, America can
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